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• Professional communicators should 
be paying more attention to non-
hierarchical workplaces, in particular, 
those with democratic aims. 
• Democratic workplaces demand 
the development of certain ethical 
dispositions/characteristics in 
professional communicators: mêtis 
and equality as an ongoing practice.
• While the goals of democratic 
organizations are often noble, 
inequalities can still emerge, thus 
the need to recognize the equality 
of oneself and others as an ongoing 
ethical practice rather than something 
solved solely through institutional 
mechanisms.
• A heuristic, provided in the closing 
of this article, prompts professional 
communicators to examine their 
practices in terms of equality.
Practitioner’s 
Takeaway:
Purpose: Professional communicators are becoming more invested in unique 
configurations of power in organizations, including non-hierarchical and democratic 
workplaces. While organizations dedicated to democratic processes may enact power 
differently than conventional organizations, they may fall short of practicing equality. 
This article explains the differences in non-hierarchical workplaces, considers businesses 
where democracy is a goal, and argues for considering equality as a habitual practice, 
particularly when writing regulatory documents.
Method: We conduct a review of the literature on non-hierarchical workplaces and 
organizational democracy, applying Jacques Rancière’s concept of equality to two 
examples (one using primary data collection and one using secondary data) of two 
cooperatives where organizational democracy is integral to the design of the business. 
Results: The literature review exposes an interest in mêtis (cunning, craftiness, 
flexibility) as vital to practitioner success in non-hierarchical workplaces; however, 
this article demonstrates that mêtis does not prevent inequality, even in organizations 
expressly committed to workplace democracy. 
Conclusion: Professional communicators need to consider equality not solely 
as a structural resource (as in rules, laws, policies) but as a habitual practice to 
cultivate alongside other characteristics and frameworks important to a professional 
communicator’s toolkit. 
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Professional communicators are continually becoming 
more invested in unique configurations of power in 
organizations. One of the modest aims of this article 
is to encourage more professional communicators 
to consider democratic workplaces as valid areas of 
research and employment. As Kimball (2006) rightly 
notes, while technical and professional communication 
(TPC) scholarship is expanding, most research still 
assumes an institutionalized organization marked 
by hierarchy and bureaucracy; however, as new 
technologies have changed the way professional 
communicators work, scholarship has shifted toward 
investigating flatter, more autonomous practices in 
the form of teams, networked organizations, and 
how companies make use of rhetorics of employee 
empowerment. Spinuzzi (2007, 2014), Clark (2006), 
Winsor (2001), and Zachry (2000), for example, have 
argued that relationships of power and communication 
go beyond a top-down structure. Thus, even within 
an apparently rigid bureaucracy, communication 
and power are more complex than they may first 
appear (Winsor, 2003). This research has unveiled the 
many means by which organizations (even ostensibly 
democratic ones) produce arrangements of power that 
place one person over another (Clark, 2006; Longo, 
2000; Winsor, 1996, 2003). This suggests that while 
democratic organizations may enact power differently 
than conventional organizations, they can fall short of 
actualizing goals of equality.
As we state above, our main goal is to encourage 
professional communicators to consider non-hierarchical 
workplaces, in particular, democratic organizations, as 
legitimate sites of TPC research and practice. Now, not 
all non-hierarchical organizations aim to be democratic. 
And while we make this distinction throughout this 
article, we focus on workplace democracies in particular. 
Democracy, of course, can function as a god-term, or 
a term that carries high-emotional impact but may be 
rarely examined. While there are many definitions of 
democracy in political science and philosophy, we look 
to the oft-cited Bachrach and Botwinich (1992), who 
define workplace democracy as employees participating 
equally “in decision making at all levels in which they 
work” (p. 163). 
In the first half of this article, we argue that 
workplace democracies require practitioners to cultivate 
qualities such as mêtic intelligence and an ethical 
disposition (in the sense of an Aristotelian virtue) 
committed to equality as an ongoing practice. In the 
second half, we apply our framework to two examples: 
one from primary research data and one from secondary 
data analysis. Through these examples, we show that 
even workplaces with explicit democratic organizational 
design can see acts of inequality emerge. We show that 
the organizational conditions and written policies can 
enable some employees to practice mêtis, making them 
feel empowered/enabled, but these resources do not 
necessarily extend to all employees. 
Broadly, we argue that professional communicators 
should remain interested in workplace democracy. 
Such an investment should not assume that equality 
inevitably occurs in those spaces, however. For 
workplace democracy to succeed, it demands an ethic 
that recognizes equality (and inequality) in everyday 
practices and habits, not only in organizational design 
and writing practices, such as dispute resolution 
documentation or worker councils.
Overview of Non-Hierarchical Workplaces
TPC researchers such as Spinuzzi are beginning to 
look at communication, project management, and 
other workplace practices in non-hierarchical and 
networked workplace configurations (2013, 2015) 
and non-employee firms (2014). These organizations 
are sometimes referred to as “horizontal” or “flat,” in 
contrast to vertical or “top-down” arrangements. This 
rhetorical framing enables stakeholders to envision 
themselves as equal partners, even if some organizations 
are “flatter,” or more democratic, than others. 
Despite the movement to understand workplace 
democracy in discourse and cultural studies for some 
time now (see Gee, Hull, & Lankshear, 1986), TPC has 
surprisingly little scholarship on the subject of workplace 
democracy and the distinctions of non-hierarchical 
organization. Spinuzzi, however, has taken up Waterman 
Jr.’s (1990) ideas on adhocracies to include “all-edge 
adhocracies”—which are highly collaborative, often 
temporary team-based projects extending beyond the 
organizational boundaries, or “edges” (Spinuzzi, 2015). 
TPC scholarship also has shown interest in networking 
and worker autonomy (Johnson-Eilola, 1996) and 
extra-institutional practices (Kimball, 2006, 2017). 
Outside of TPC scholarship, other researchers have 
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considered innovative workplace structures, such as the 
holacracy—a copyrighted management system operating 
by autonomous teams with a central decision maker 
(Robertson, 2015)—and distributed information-based 
systems grounded in a knowledge sharing (see, for 
example, Drucker, 1987; Gee, Hull, & Lankshear, 1986; 
Skyrme, 2007; Thrift, 2005). 
Nevertheless, many people are unfamiliar with, 
skeptical of, or even resistant to alternative workplace 
structures (Kastelle, 2013). For example, when Zappos 
converted to a holacracy and offered a severance 
package to employees who did not want to remain 
for the conversion, 29% of their workforce left the 
company (Reingold, 2016). Distrust of unconventional 
workplace practices also may be the cause of current 
resistance to Agile project management strategies 
(Denning, 2012). The values, practices, and frameworks 
that are well-suited for conventional, bureaucratic 
businesses, therefore, may not work in alternative 
workplaces. The unique characteristics of these 
structures require commitment to the development of 
deliberate strategies, habits, and philosophies. 
We point to these distinctions, because, while 
scholars carefully consider arrangements of power in 
an organization, many of us take the manifestation 
of hierarchy for granted (Harrison, 1994, p. 249). 
This is an assumption that Hart and Conklin (2006) 
rightly critique when they argue for a redefinition of 
the role of the professional communicator. Their study 
participants showed “a vision of the profession that 
is non-hierarchical and highly networked” (p. 412). 
Nevertheless, as they point out, and as our own personal 
experiences confirm, hierarchy is often assumed in TPC 
pedagogy, practice, and research, and scholars from 
related fields (business administration, communication 
studies, etc.) have noted that many teach, manage, and 
evaluate success under the following assumptions: 
1. “You need a hierarchy to succeed,”
2. “The people who do the work are of lower status 
than those who decide what work to do,” and
3. “Organizations that do not follow the norms are 
likely to fail” (Kastelle, 2013; see, also, Alvesson & 
Willmott, 2003; Spicer, Alvesson & Kärreman, 2009; 
Cheney, 1995; Harrison, 1994; Rinehart, 2006).
Though the presupposition of bureaucratic 
management remains persuasive and fundamental to 
success for some, non-hierarchical and other democratic 
businesses have challenged this assumption and its 
underlying structuring of power. Scholars, practitioners, 
and entrepreneurs alike have continued to challenge 
the requirement of hierarchy by advocating for and 
instituting alternative forms of organizing work. 
In an extensive survey of organizational democracy, 
Rothschild-Whitt (1979) compared collectivist-
democratic organizations to conventional, bureaucratic 
organizations along eight points: authority, rules, 
social control, social relations, recruitment and 
advancement, incentive structures, social stratifications, 
and differentiations (pp. 511–517). Using these points 
of comparison, Rothschild-Whitt created a metric for 
evaluating organizational democracy. While Rothschild-
Whitt’s categories are almost four decades old, we 
still find value in them as her study is one of the few 
comprehensive studies of its kind. She categorized such 
different workplaces as falling along the following scale: 
Figure 1. Scale of Organizational Democracy (Adapted from 
Rothschild-Whitt, 1979, p. 525)
According to Rothschild-Whitt’s (1979) scale 
(see Figure 1), non-hierarchical organizations can fall 
anywhere along the first three categories but would 
not include the last (hierarchical arrangements). In 
this article, then, when we say “non-hierarchical,” 
we refer to any type of arrangement within these 
three categories. Importantly, the scale shows that 
horizontalism, or non-hierarchy, does not equate 
with democratic commitments. In other words, it is 
important not to conflate non-hierarchy with workplace 
democracy. For instance, adhocracies (Waterman Jr., 
1993; Spinuzzi, 2015) and holacracies (Robertson, 
2015) are flat and non-hierarchical but not democratic, 
in the sense that they are not rooted in democratic 
goals. Organizations may try non-hierarchical 
arrangements not because of ideological commitments 
to democracy; instead, they may see these arrangements 
as pragmatic to their goals of increased productivity 
or employee buy-in (Craig & Pencavel, 1995; Kato, 
Poutsma, & Ligthart, 2017; Valve, 2012; Zwick, 2004). 
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What distinguishes a democratic workplace is not just 
its methods but its end goals of highly participatory 
employee engagement, more equally distributed 
compensation, and/or more employee control of the 
workplace (Bernstein, 1982; Brodwin, 2013; Cheney, 
1995; Harrison, 1994), which we discuss further below. 
Some well-known companies have experimented 
with or otherwise adopted non-hierarchical workplaces 
or ownership models, including the Associated 
Press, Land O’ Lakes, Organic Valley, Recreational 
Equipment Inc. (REI), tens of thousands of credit 
unions, and democratically run businesses, such as 
Patagonia, Github, Valve, WordPress, and 37Signals. 
Understandably, some readers may question the 
economic practicality of democratic workplaces, 
because most of us are just not used to talking about 
them. Nevertheless, the viability of such organizations 
has been well documented (see, for example, Brodwin, 
2013; Craig & Pencavel, 1995). While establishing the 
viability of these organizations is beyond the scope of 
this article, we do hope that the short list above shows 
the growing need to investigate the non-hierarchical 
workplaces in which professional communicators might 
find themselves. This list should also demonstrate the 
need to continually reevaluate how we understand 
concepts such as democracy and equality. 
Democratic Workplaces
While any organization can employ elements of 
democracy, not all non-hierarchical structures are 
necessarily committed to workplace democracy as an 
end unto itself. Bernstein (1982) offered one metric 
to measure democracy in those workplaces explicitly 
committed to democratic ideals. This metric has been 
used to evaluate development strategies (Cheney, 1995) 
still being used in cooperatives today (see cultivate.coop; 
ica.coop; Mondragon Cooperative Corporation; nasco.
coop; University of Wisconsin Center for Cooperatives) 
and is often cited in cooperative theory (Cheney, Santa 
Cruz, Peredo, & Nazareno, 2014; May, Cheney, & Roper, 
2007; Williams, 2007). Bernstein’s (1982) original metric 
defines workplace democracy along the following points:
1. “The degree of control workers enjoy over any 
particular decision,”
2. “The issues over which that control is exercised,” and
3. “The organizational level at which their control is 
exercised” (p. 53; Cheney, 1995; see, also, Kaswan, 
2013; Kato, Poutsma, & Ligthart, 2017).
This metric demonstrates the most fundamental 
aim of workplace democracy: participation (Cheney, 
1995). As evidence, Bernstein describes participation 
as occurring along a continuum (1982, p. 57). The 
most minimal form of worker participation is the 
“suggestion box,” in part “[b]ecause it lacks face-to-
face communication and frequently does not include 
even a response by management” (Bernstein, 1982, p. 
57). Bernstein names worker councils or assemblies 
as best meeting the above metric, when workers exert 
full control over the organization and managerial 
decisions (1982, p. 58). Isthmus Engineering and 
Manufacturing (Billeaux, Reynolds, Young-Hyman, 
& Zayim, 2011) and Co-op Cab (discussed below) 
are examples of such democratic control. Employee 
participation rather than ownership is the fundamental 
component of democratization because “firms which 
are entirely worker-owned” can still “lack any degree of 
democratization” (Bernstein, 1982, pp. 76–77), as in 
the case of employee stock option plans. 
In looking at organizations that are not top-down, 
we must not conflate the differences among alternative 
organizations. Flatter, or horizontal, businesses have 
fewer levels of management and may distribute 
knowledge and decision making more equally than 
conventional businesses. That is, employees or teams of 
employees may act autonomously, but the organization 
may include centralized decision makers (Drucker, 
1987; Robertson, 2015; Waterman Jr., 1993). In 
contrast, an intentionally democratic business “involves 
management that is less autocratic and confers more 
power on individual employees” (Rayasam, 2008, para. 
3). A workplace based on an ideal of democracy may 
include voting systems, debates, town hall-style forums, 
or branch autonomy (Rayasam, 2008). 
One Type of Democratic 
Workplace: The Cooperative
Historically, workplace democracy in the US has two 
important threads: African-American collectivism and 
the late 60s–70s counterculture. African-American 
communities have engaged in collectivism since the 
Antebellum era as a way to meet their economic 
and political needs (Gordon Nembhard, 2014). 
Communalism and collectivism arising from 60s–70s 
anti-authoritarianism brought about communal 
ownership and living arrangements, such as land trusts, 
housing cooperatives, and communes (Rothschild-Whitt, 
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1979). The contemporary cooperative in the US owes 
its existence in part to these movements. At its most 
bare definition, a cooperative is a business that is owned 
by the people who use it (Gordon Nembhard, 2014, 
p. 2) and that could fall under any of the categories 
in Rothschild-Whitt’s (1979) scale of organizational 
democracy (see Figure 1), even hierarchical, depending 
upon its degree of democratic commitments. 
There are three types of cooperatives: consumer, 
producer, and employee (Gordon Nembhard, 2014, p. 
3). First, in consumer cooperatives, people pool their 
resources to meet needs not supplied elsewhere or that 
are too costly for individuals (p. 3). One example of 
a consumer cooperative is neighbors in a food desert 
opening a grocery store to provide healthy, affordable 
food options. The consumer cooperative may be the 
most common and may feel to some shareholders 
(consumers) to be the least democratic. Commonly, the 
consumer would purchase a membership (a “share”) 
and then exert control through electing their Board of 
Directors or through other avenues provided by the 
cooperative. A second type is the producer cooperative, 
formed as a business that jointly purchases supplies or 
jointly processes and markets goods and materials, for 
example, agricultural cooperatives (Gordon Nembhard, 
2014, p. 3). Finally, employee cooperatives are 
formed so employees can “own and manage a business 
themselves,” in order “to stabilize employment, make 
policy, and share the profits” (Gordon Nembhard, 
2014, p. 3). Though conditions may vary, of these three 
types of cooperatives, an employee cooperative most 
closely fits the definition of a democratic workplace, 
because the employees have influence over how the 
business is managed. 
To this point, we have now designated the kind 
of workplace most likely to engage in democratic 
practices—a workplace committed to aims of employee 
democracy. We have taken the time to make this 
distinction in order to better prepare professional 
communicators who might find themselves working 
in any organization that lays claims to non-hierarchy 
or democratic practices. Looking at these kinds of 
organizations is important, because of TPC’s sometimes 
over-emphasis on hierarchy and bureaucracy, especially 
as professional communicators are more likely than 
ever to find themselves working in some type of 
non-hierarchical workplace (Hart & Conklin, 2006; 
Johnson-Eilola, 1996). 
It is important to recognize that even those 
organizations committed to workplace democracy 
may at times struggle to practice equal participation. 
“Non-hierarchy” and “democracy” can sound sexy to 
professional communicators looking to find meaningful 
employment, but that does not mean they won’t find 
themselves in an organization that falls short of its 
democratic goals. In other words, just because an 
organization has structural resources (policies, rules) 
dedicated to democratic practices does not mean that its 
employees automatically know how to practice equality, 
something much easier said than done, and something 
not easy to define. This is the larger point of this 
article: that unless professional communicators have 
developed certain ethical dispositions, they will struggle 
or meet resistance when working in non-hierarchical 
organizations, in particular, workplace democracies. In 
the sections below, we further explicate this exigence, 
advocate for examples of such ethical dispositions, and 
then apply them to two examples. 
The Exigence for Dispositions of 
Mêtic Intelligence and Equality 
We use the term disposition here in reference to 
Aristotle’s virtue ethics (2004). Broadly conceived, 
traditional definitions of ethics are defined as “the 
study of values and proper conduct” (Markel, 2000, p. 
21). Consistent with this definition, but more specific, 
Aristotle described ethics as centered around the term 
hexis, which can be translated as habit, comportment, 
characteristic, or disposition. This focus on dispositions, 
rather than fixed moral principles, is a result of his 
belief—and that of many contemporary virtue ethicists 
since (see, for example, Vallor, 2016)—that ethics are 
messy, always context-specific, and cannot be pinned 
down in any absolute sense. Nevertheless, this criticism 
of fixed principles does not preclude agreement on 
certain ethical dispositions. Some of Aristotle’s examples 
of virtuous dispositions include patience, truthfulness, 
and generosity. As a brief example, while two parties 
might disagree on what a disposition of patience looks 
like in some exact sense, usually they will agree that 
patience is a moral characteristic, or disposition, that is 
good for one to inhabit, for one to cultivate and develop. 
 One example of the kind of dispositions needed 
for success in non-hierarchical spaces, and which 
has received attention lately in TPC scholarship 
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(Pope-Ruark, 2014; Wilson & Wolford, 2017), is 
“mêtic intelligence.” Mêtis (cunning, craftiness) is a 
term used by ancient Greek rhetoricians referring to the 
cultivation of a flexible form of creativity that could be 
used across particular or unexpected circumstances. It 
is a form of what Aristotle (2004) called phronesis, or 
the pragmatic forms of reasoning that characterize the 
sort of everyday decisions professional communicators 
make. A simple example of mêtis might be a 
professional communicator determining the kinds of 
euphemisms that are acceptable or appropriate to use 
in a company-wide memo determining, explaining, 
or critiquing bathroom policies regarding transgender 
individuals. A person with a mêtic disposition will be 
rhetorically flexible toward what (in this case) might 
not be an everyday company memo—a memo that, 
depending on the circumstances, may require a not-so-
everyday response. 
One argument for the need to cultivate mêtic 
intelligence in professional communicators occurs 
within a discussion of the software project management 
strategy Agile (Pope-Ruark, 2014). Whereas traditional 
project management philosophies such as “waterfall 
planning” privilege top-down management that 
supports a clearly defined final project, Agile is 
specifically designed to be used in a non-hierarchical 
space, whether that space is an organization as a whole 
or simply a cross-functional team. Agile requires 
the flexibility needed to respond to unexpected 
circumstances, “situationally specific strategies, processes 
and practices” (Anderson et al., 2005, emphasis in 
original; qtd. in Pope-Ruark, 2014, p. 329). 
In evaluating hierarchical versus non-hierarchical 
management strategies, Pope-Ruark (2014) argues that 
mêtis adds “depth to our reading of rhetorical situations, 
decisions about appropriate response, creativity in 
invention, and concern for ethical production” (pp. 
327–328). The context of this comment occurs in her 
discussion of how hierarchical content management 
systems often require two rigidly stratified classes of 
users: one responsible for setting tasks, the other waiting 
upon instruction with little room for independent 
initiative. By comparison, Agile predicates itself upon 
a decentralized system where all project stakeholders 
(whether managers, coders, engineers, subordinators, 
etc.) are on equal footing in terms of the ability to create 
and interact. In brief, Pope-Ruark (2014) claims that 
using project management methodologies designed 
for non-hierarchical systems demands a certain kind of 
professional communicator: one with a mêtic disposition.
We believe that this starting place is a crucial 
spot for thinking about the complexities of ethics in 
democratic workplaces. While the recent advocacy of 
mêtic intelligence in TPC scholarship is persuasive, 
one issue is that it carries no guarantee of the kind 
of ethical behavior most professional communicators 
would promote. One might very well find cunning 
and craftiness in an “ethic of expediency” (Katz, 1992). 
Dolmage (2016) also notes that mêtis is not necessarily 
an ethical good; rather, it requires a supplemental 
moral purpose to achieve ethical ends (p. 163). In a 
comment we do not mean as critical, neither Pope-
Ruark (2014) nor Wilson and Wolford (2017) define 
the kind of supplemental ethics that a mêtic professional 
communicator should embody. As we demonstrate 
below, ethically questionable practices can occur even 
in workplaces intentionally designed to be democratic. 
These non-traditional workplaces that professional 
communicators are becoming more invested in demand 
more specific ethical supplementation.
Thus, just as mêtic intelligence is continuing to be 
promoted in TPC scholarship, we believe it is necessary 
to think more specifically about other kinds of ethical 
dispositions that complement the methodologies, work 
arrangements, and organizations that benefit from mêtic 
intelligence. We believe that such additional ethical 
supplementation includes a disposition committed 
to equality, which understands equality not only as 
a resource to distribute but as a habitual ongoing 
practice that is a characteristic (or disposition) of a good 
professional communicator.
For the remainder of this article, we apply such 
a notion of equality—as a dispositional ongoing 
practice rather than solely a resource to redistribute—
to two examples of intentionally designed democratic 
workplaces: (1) a case study originally conducted by 
Hoffman (2005) on an employee cooperative that 
experienced ethical communication conflicts, and 
(2) a primary study conducted by one of the authors 
on a cooperative that saw social capital disrupt a 
commitment to equality. We hope to show that, even 
with the best intentions, and within organizations 
intentionally designed with democratic values like 
those described by Bernstein (1982), inequality can still 
occur. For democratic and non-hierarchical workplaces 
to succeed, then, practitioners need to approach 
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equality as ongoing practice, as a crucial, habitual 
characteristic of a professional communicator.
Equality as an Ongoing Practice
Most professional communicators will acknowledge 
that ethics is a core value to the field. The field has 
embraced what could be called ethical turns, including 
social perspectives (Blyler & Thralls, 1993) and cultural 
studies perspectives (Scott, Longo, & Wills, 2007), 
which investigate issues of power and legitimacy. 
However, even with these culturally conscious turns, 
Dombrowski’s (1999) and Markel’s (2000) foundational 
works on ethics in the field, and a special issue on ethics 
more than a decade ago (Dragga, 2001), ethics courses 
are still “not highly represented” in TPC curricula 
(Meloncon & Henschel, 2013). Calling attention to 
particular ethical frameworks, such as utilitarianism, 
deontology, or virtue ethics is uncommon. 
The recent calls for incorporating mêtic intelligence 
in TPC (Pope-Ruark, 2014; Wilson & Wolford, 2017) 
are clearly motivated by ethical concerns. In paying 
attention to non-hierarchical spaces, Pope-Ruark’s (2014) 
advocacy for mêtic intelligence is clearly motivated by an 
implicit democratic or egalitarian ethic. That is, work on 
mêtis is interested in philosophies that believe workers 
feel more fulfilled or content and are more effective in 
their workplaces if they have greater influence. This is 
not to say all work on mêtis is invested in equality or 
that ethics always equates to equality, only that an ethic 
invested in notions of equality appears to be a driving 
force for those interested in workplace democracy. 
Democratic workplaces are thus prime locations to 
investigate the relationship of mêtis and equality. The 
logistics of “horizontalism” are not necessarily difficult; 
however, the challenge comes in finding employees who 
are committed to values of collective work (Hartman, 
2010). For example, the use of a non-hierarchical 
methodology may enable those who have cultivated 
mêtis to have a better chance of succeeding within 
a democratic workplace, but the creation of such a 
space in no way guarantees that even those with mêtis 
will take part in the type of egalitarian practices their 
workplace would seem to demand.
To reiterate, the concept of mêtis, which a number 
of scholars (Detienne & Vernant, 1991; Dolmage, 
2009; Hawhee, 2013; Pope-Ruark, 2014; Scott, 2008; 
Wilson & Wolford, 2017) have drawn upon in the 
rhetorical tradition, is a form of “bodily intelligence” 
(Hawhee, 2013, p. 46). It is often translated as cunning, 
wily intelligence, or wisdom (Dolmage, 2009 p. 5). 
Mêtis is an acquired type of intelligence that enables one 
to act with cunning across a wide variety of contingent 
rhetorical situations, a ‘‘flexible, context-attentive 
intelligence” (Scott, p. 2008). It is precisely this capacity 
for flexibility and context awareness that makes mêtis so 
relevant to professional communicators. 
If collective work demands or at least benefits 
from professional communicators developing mêtic 
intelligence, then such constraints also demand a 
specific commitment to an ethical framework that 
values equality. Much as some scholars (Detienne & 
Vernant, 1991; Dolmage, 2009; Hawhee, 2013; Pope-
Ruark, 2014; Scott, 2008) view mêtic intelligence 
as a supplement to practical wisdom, we view a 
dispositional ethic of equality as a necessary supplement 
for effective work to take place in non-hierarchical and 
democratic spaces, whatever forms they may take. In 
other words, for these workplaces to function as they 
are designed, they also require participants to commit 
to an ethic of equality. By a commitment to equality 
we do not mean a general value in equality, such as in 
the statement, “I believe we are all equals.” Rather, we 
suggest a commitment to equality that recognizes that 
even in the most democratically driven spaces—such as 
employee-owned cooperatives—acts of inequality can 
happen. Thus, a disposition committed to equality as 
an ongoing practice is a necessary supplement to the 
contemporary professional communicator’s toolbox. For 
the articulation of such a disposition, we turn to the 
French political philosopher Rancière (1995; 1999).
Rancière (1995; 1999), whose work has been 
applied convincingly to U.S. contexts (see Ross, 
1991; May, 2008), differs from a number of other 
contemporary political theorists, because he views 
equality not as something to be distributed—that is, 
as an institutional provision like a right to vote, which 
is often the case for liberal notions of equality (see 
Colton and Holmes, 2018)—but as a practice requiring 
continual verification. Even within a representative 
democracy, Rancière argues that hierarchies—what 
he calls “partitions of the sensible”—will inevitably 
form. In brief, by “sensible,” Rancière means that 
hierarchical partitions seem intuitive to us. They seem 
to be “common sense.” For example, even though 
the Occupy Wall Street movement in Zucatti Park 
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claimed an ideological commitment to democracy and 
egalitarian governance, White male activists nevertheless 
dominated group deliberations, and the Occupy 
movement even faced accusations of anti-Semitism 
(Berger, 2011). As a result, the Occupy Wall Street 
participants were moved to eventually require a rule to 
ensure that non-White and female speakers were able to 
speak before a White male. 
We use the example of Occupy Wall Street not 
to dismiss the impact of this movement but more to 
highlight Rancière’s argument that inequality and 
hierarchy inevitably occur even when direct democracy 
or equality is the designed system of distribution: 
“‘Social reality’ is a reality of inequality” (1995, p. 
48). A partition of the sensible can and will occur in 
any text, discourse, community, law, family, church, 
or organization, and these partitions can include any 
cultural habit and/or practice that prohibits or limits 
even one individual from being recognized as an equal. 
A clear example is when segregation in the deep south 
banned African-Americans from sitting in “Whites 
only” restaurants. What Rancière (1995, 1999) calls a 
verification of equality consists of acts of “dissensus” 
(1999) that disturb any partition of the sensible, such 
as when African-Americans staged sit-in protests in 
“Whites only” diners. In Rancière’s terms, the protesters 
sought to verify their own equality within a legal and 
state-supported partition of the sensible that did not 
recognize or intentionally masked their equality.
While a sit-in is perhaps an obvious example, 
Rancière (1995; 1999) argues that partitions of the 
sensible occur in even the most democratically designed 
spaces, as our examples below demonstrate, sometimes 
even in places marked by an abundance of consent. 
For example, employees who cannot afford to leave 
their jobs may feel it necessary to consent to their 
own mistreatment in order to stay employed. Thus, 
understanding equality in Rancière’s terms means that 
one is never complacent or content by the institutional 
mechanisms or structures within which one is situated, 
even if a particular structure was designed in the 
name of democracy. If one is committed to equality 
as Rancière sees it, one recognizes that any verification 
of a person’s equality might be fleeting at best and 
may require renewed practices of recognition: first, 
the habitual re-appraisal of a situation to determine 
whether someone’s equality may be going unrecognized 
and, then, the demonstration (whether grand or small) 
that this someone (whether oneself or another) is an 
equal and deserves to be treated as such. Again, as 
counterintuitive as it may seem, such verifications 
of equality can often take the form of dissent in 
appearance. A demonstration that equality is not being 
verified will disrupt the stable order of things, even if 
that order was established through consent. While this 
notion of equality as an ongoing practice may sound 
exhausting, it is important to realize that we see this 
notion of equality as dispositional, as a habit that can 
be cultivated. While habits are not always easy to make 
or break, the strength of Rancière’s idea of equality is 
that it enables enactment anywhere; it does not require 
institutional structures to verify one’s equality. 
To make the significance of our connection 
between Rancièreian equality and mêtis explicit to 
professional communicators, we want to affirm that we 
are not arguing for a specific communicative act but 
a disposition that can be applied to multiple forms of 
technical writing. Equality in Rancière’s sense is akin 
to an Aristotelian virtue ethic in that there is no fixed 
version of its enactment, but it is a practice. According 
to May (2001), practices comprise
(1) goal-directedness,
(2) social normative governance, and
(3) regularity of behavior. 
First, practices have a purpose, an aim in mind. 
Second, practices are governed socially and normatively: 
Multiple people will know how to carry out the 
practice, and there will be standards determining 
(often multiple) correct and incorrect ways of doing it. 
Finally, practices contain a regularity of behavior: “In 
order for something to be a practice, the various people 
engaged in it must be able to be said to be ‘doing the 
same thing’ under some reasonable description of their 
behavior” (May, 2001, p. 12). As a basic example, most 
professional communicators practice proofreading 
on some level, yet they proofread at different times 
for different purposes (editing for content, grammar, 
design, etc.). They do so differently but with enough 
similarity that they can recognize the practice of 
proofreading a document, and they recognize that there 
are better and worse ways of proofreading. 
Equality, then, is not something that is always 
going to look the same to each person, and this can be 
difficult when trying to conceptualize it as a professional 
communication practice; however, equality in Rancière’s 
sense is based in practices, one’s repeated actions in 
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re-verifying one’s or another’s equality whenever one 
sees that equality being erased or ignored. This practice 
of recognizing others’ equality could be employed when 
writing policies, internal memos, manuals, even casual 
emails (or not, as in the case of sexual harassment). 
Thus, we claim that professional communicators 
should develop dispositions in which they see equality 
as a cultivated habit that might be put into practice in 
different situations and actions, including democratic 
workplaces. Again, above any other contribution, 
Rancière sees political equality as something that must 
be continually re-verified by individuals whose daily 
lives are impacted by partitions of the sensible and, in 
turn, aided and allied by individuals who can recognized 
this struggle in others and be in a position to be an ally 
or advocate.
Cooperatives, Mêtic Intelligence, and 
the Need for Dispositional Equality
Even democratically controlled organizations, 
such as employee-owned cooperatives, can have 
inequality demonstrated within their organizations. 
Correspondingly, we see within these scenarios an ideal 
opportunity to locate the need to cultivate dispositions 
of mêtis and equality as an ongoing practice. One 
example of such a demonstration of inequality within 
a democratic workplace is found in Hoffman’s (2005) 
case study of Coop Cab and Edenfield’s (2018) study of 
Owen’s House Pub.
We look at these two examples (one is secondary 
research; the other is primary research) for a variety of 
reasons. First, each organization relies on professional 
communication and documentation in order to 
function, including dispute resolution documents such 
as incident reports, grievance process instructions, and 
related documents (Hoffman, 2005; Edenfield, 2018). 
Some dispute resolution communication practices are 
potentially extra-institutional, such as when employees 
apply social pressure (Hoffman, 2005; Edenfield, 
2018). Second, both define themselves as democratic 
workplaces—workplaces that often require researchers 
to look to alternative and non-expert sites that are 
less conventional to TPC research, including taxicab 
companies and pubs. While deciding what sites of 
TPC research are legitimate can be an ideological issue 
(Alvesson, 1991; Berlin, 1988; Blyer, 1995; Harrison, 
1994; Herndl, 1991, 1993), we follow in the tradition 
of those scholars and practitioners who view TPC 
broadly (Johnson-Eiola, 2004; Kimball, 2006). 
Hoffman’s (2005) study of Coop Cab focuses on 
procedural justice and how men and women differ 
in their dispute resolution communication strategies, 
formal and informal. A worker-owned cooperative 
taxicab company, Coop Cab uses a Workers’ Council 
to solve disputes after formal complaints. Hoffman 
(2005) concludes that both men and women had 
misgivings about the grievance process. According to 
Hoffman (2005), when men had disputes, they saw 
the cooperative structure as affording them informal 
(one might say mêtic) opportunities to discuss conflict 
resolution with their worker supervisors; however, the 
flat structure also “discouraged them from using the 
formal grievance procedures,” as recourse through the 
formal structure signified to them a failure to resolve 
any issues they had with their peers (2005, p. 69). 
On the other hand, Hoffman’s study showed that 
women did not even consider the informal process. 
Their choices were reduced to “raise a formal grievance 
or to do nothing” (2005, p. 70). Thus, the ways that 
grievances were resolved in this particular employee-
owned business potentially produced unequal power 
relations, in some cases leading to employees leaving, 
and, in other cases, legal consequences.
Although she does not use the term, Hoffman 
(2005) is clearly describing partitions of the sensible, 
as Rancière would put it, as well as an institutional 
context that could benefit from the cultivation of 
mêtic dispositions committed to equality. Hoffman’s 
study shows how “informal power and other societal 
inequalities may sufficiently permeate democratic 
workplaces and perpetuate the difficulties women 
contend with in formal grievance resolution” (2005, 
p. 52). Put in terms of mêtis, certain informal 
conventions of Coop Cab enabled men to practice 
forms of cunning, craftiness, and flexibility in their 
communication but seemed to restrict women from 
participating in the same types of communication. 
These conventions gave men an advantage in resolving 
their grievances. Two different examples of the 
difficulties women faced in Coop Cab as a result of the 
“informal power and social inequalities” include the 
cases of “Ursula” and “Shirley.” According to Hoffman’s 
study, Ursula was one employee of Coop Cab who 
articulated that the grievance procedures were “to act 
formally or not act at all,” and that not acting at all was 
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sometimes better because of the stress and anxiety that 
occurred as a result of the formal process (2005, p. 70). 
She felt that the formal process placed the burden on 
the person writing the grievance documentation:
It’s like, how much am I willing to put up with? 
How much energy do I feel like putting into 
paperwork and filing a grievance and trying to 
articulate relatively minor things to other people? 
Not necessarily that they are really minor, but I 
don’t have that energy. It’s like, is it easier to fight 
for certain things or is it easier to put up with it 
and wait through it ’til you get to the end of it? 
(Hoffman, 2005, p. 70)
A more extreme case is that of Shirley, who felt 
her only recourse was to sue the cooperative. Hoffman 
writes, “Shirley had brought several grievances before 
the Workers’ Council and anticipated bringing more in 
the future” (2005, p. 72). The Workers’ Council, whom 
she saw as her peers, ruled that her grievance would 
not make it to an official hearing to be heard by the 
Workers’ Council. Even though Shirley used a formal 
process—writing a grievance report and submitting it 
to the Workers’ Council—to ensure democracy, her 
appeal was denied. This denial of a hearing was a clear 
demonstration of a partition of the sensible emerging. 
Similar to Ursula, Shirley did not see any recourse in an 
informal process, even though the formal process failed 
her; however, she felt so strongly about her grievance 
that she decided to go outside of the cooperative via 
a lawsuit. Unfortunately, one consequence of this 
decision was that her fellow employees began to shame 
her. This shaming bordered on harassment: “There were 
things all over the bulletin board that anybody who sues 
their own cooperative should get the fuck out if they’re 
not happy. It’s like, if you don’t love your country, leave 
it, so to speak” (qtd. in Hoffman, 2005, p. 72).
In contrast to Ursula’s and Shirley’s experiences, 
the male employees at Coop Cab felt that tolerating 
the anxieties of the formal process was not even an 
issue. In this particular work environment, and from 
their perspectives, their own experiences offered no 
partitions of the sensible to overcome. Rather than “this 
or nothing,” the men’s choices were among an array of 
informal dispute resolution options (Hoffman, 2005, p. 
70). Most of the men at Coop Cab who had a grievance 
believed that for most conflicts, the Workers’ Council 
did not need to be bothered, as another example from 
Hoffman demonstrates:
Jon: You can’t get so worked up. Like some people 
get all worked up and bring a grievance about 
everything. That’s their right; that’s OK. But, me, 
I like to just talk to the person. Like if I think a 
dispatcher isn’t treating me fairly, I’ll just go and 
talk to the guy and reason with him. I don’t get all 
excited. (2005, p. 71)
In the cases of Jon, Ursula, and Shirley above, 
structural equalities such as formal dispute processes are 
“supposed” to be the same for everyone, but as these 
examples demonstrate, the dispute resolution processes 
opened the way for unequal treatment based upon 
gender difference. Male employees were clearly able to 
cultivate a rich sense of mêtis within these procedures, 
as they felt they were able to be flexible in how they 
communicated their disputes. However, these forms 
of mêtis were not reflective of equality in Rancière’s 
sense. For Rancière, someone committed to equality 
will habitually re-appraise any situation in which even 
one person may be treated as less than another, and, 
in response, call for that person to be recognized as an 
equal. This call to recognize one’s equality need not 
be a grand political gesture. For example, we might 
imagine that if the cooperative employees saw equality 
as an ongoing practice, they would be more willing 
to see that strict reliance on formal dispute resolution 
communication might inadvertently create conditions 
of unequal treatment. To rectify this situation, the 
solution is not that women in the cooperative should 
just adopt the mêtic practices of the men. Rather than 
saying Ursula and Shirley shouldn’t “get so worked 
up,” a hypothetical response rooted in equality from 
Jon could have been that they should not have to get 
so worked up. That is, Jon could have questioned 
why he felt he had access to informal options and 
they did not, and he could use his informal access 
to advocate for them. The unstated decorum of the 
workplace culture, even though explicitly committed to 
democratic principles, created a partition of the sensible 
that privileged men over women in terms of dispute 
resolution communication practices. 
Jon’s flexible reactions to disputes—i.e., accessing 
informal methods of communication—were mêtic in 
practice, but they did not recognize the women’s equality. 
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If Jon worked out of a notion of equality as an ongoing 
practice, then he likely would be more sympathetic 
and even encouraging to Ursula and Shirley when they 
used the formal grievance process. In this example, 
then, we see that just because someone works in a 
democratic workplace does not mean they will inherently 
embody an ethic of equality. In other words, Coop Cab 
demonstrates that, while democratic workplaces may be 
able to cultivate a generalized sense of mêtis among some 
employees (the men, in this case), there is no guarantee 
that employees will treat each other fairly.
Of course, Coop Cab is not the only democratic 
workplace whose admirable goals of democratic 
participation are not without the challenges of unequal 
power relations. Owen’s House, a pub in a working-
class neighborhood that operates through shared 
management among 10–15 employees (ranging 
from bartenders to cleaning staff) and the Board of 
Directors, also demonstrated the kinds of unfortunate 
social inequalities that occurred in Coop Cab. As part 
of Edenfield’s (2016) two-year study, five long-time 
participants of Owen’s House were interviewed. One of 
those participants, “Lamar,” mentioned in his interview 
that when conflict arose over an issue not important 
to an employee, it was expedient at times to allow 
those with stronger feelings to influence or dominate 
governance, ultimately shaping the cooperative in 
ways that may not have reflected the organization’s 
democratic commitments: 
I feel like so many people involved are just nice 
fucking people, not that they aren’t strong or not 
willing to fight for shit, but it’s just not worth 
it to deal with the negativity and the backlash 
from standing up to someone. It allows people 
who are more controlling to control because the 
other people are like, “Okay, I’ll just keep going 
and deal with my own shit.” When the potential 
consequences are nastiness and negativity and it’s 
something you don’t feel strongly about, it’s just 
easier not to participate. The people who are more 
forceful are the ones who are going to get their way 
because the rest of us, while we care, in all these 
little bitty things, it’s just not worth it. (Lamar, 
personal communication, July 15, 2014) 
Like Coop Cab, Owen’s House had grievance 
processes dedicated to democratic procedures 
(Edenfield, 2018). Nevertheless, as Lamar expressed 
above, instances of inequality could still occur (and 
not only along gender lines), even though democratic 
principles were central to Owen’s House’s mission. 
In cases such as these, consent is not necessarily 
an absolute ethical good, as it can undermine the 
democratic values of participation. Here, someone who 
has cultivated a dispositional ethic of equality would 
be wary of public unanimity or silent consent and look 
for opportunities to recognize the equality of those 
who are being silent, perhaps directly asking for dissent 
at times. For example, at Owen’s House, those who 
found themselves continually taking the lead on writing 
and interpreting policy or taking the lead on projects 
might pause and bring attention to the fact that they 
are always leading the way, and that the same people 
continually leading is not necessarily a good thing. Even 
inadvertently, they may have perpetuated a partition of 
the sensible, in Rancière’s terms. Taking equality into 
consideration, they would refuse to accept silence as 
consent; instead, they might invite others to participate, 
to disagree openly, and to create a dialogue. 
These examples help to demonstrate our argument 
that while the cultivation of mêtic intelligence can lean 
toward ethical outcomes, the process is by no means 
inevitable. Inasmuch as partitions of the sensible 
continue to emerge within even those organizations 
explicitly committed to democratic principles, there 
exists a distinct need to cultivate a dispositional ethic 
of equality as an ongoing practice. This is a challenge. 
Equality will not inevitably be achieved within a stable 
distributive mechanism or institutional space by virtue of 
the existence of that space, even if certain organizations 
may engender these values more than others. Some 
employees working in democratic workplaces may 
be more inclined to come forward, to participate, to 
be opinionated. In certain instances, those people 
may be the appropriate person for the particular job. 
Nevertheless, a dispositional ethic of equality will 
habitually scrutinize the knee-jerk response to always 
look toward those same people to take the lead. 
Conclusion and Notes Toward Cultivating 
Dispositions of Mêtis And Equality
Professional communicators do have the power to 
influence practices of workplace equality. A professional 
communicator always has some agency to impact the 
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practice of equality, particularly if she finds herself 
in a democratic workplace. That is why cultivating 
dispositions committed to equality matters: A 
professional communicator can enact change.
There are three important points we would like our 
readers to take away from this article:
• Professional communicators should be paying 
more attention to non-hierarchical workplaces—
particularly those committed to democracy. 
• Democratic workplaces demand the development 
of certain ethical dispositions/characteristics in 
professional communicators: mêtis and equality as 
an ongoing practice.
• While the goals of democratic organizations are 
often noble, inequalities can still occur, thus the 
need to recognize the equality of oneself and others 
as an ongoing ethical practice rather than something 
solved solely through institutional policies.
While developing an ethical disposition committed 
to equality is no easy task, one of the ways people can 
consciously begin to do so is through reflecting on their 
practices. While developing new habitual practices 
is always a challenge, and a more in-depth guide to 
developing such habits is beyond the scope of this 
article, we do want to suggest questions adapted from 
May (2001) that individual professional communicators 
can ask themselves about their organization’s practices 
when writing for dispute resolution and other 
regulatory documentation: 
1. Goal directedness: What is the aim of this practice? 
What is our goal? In working toward that goal, are 
people being treated as equals in a given situation?
2. Social normative governance: What formal and 
informal processes and policies are preventing 
people from being treated as equals? What would it 
take to change those processes? What stakeholders 
are involved? Whose voice is not being heard?
3. Regularity of behavior: How can we redirect or 
change the habitual element of the practice that is 
undermining a person’s equality? How can we make 
a habit of new behaviors that do support equality?
We realize that these questions are open-ended and 
only a starting point. Answering these questions is not 
easy and will not always look the same. Professional 
communicators asking themselves these questions 
should realize that this kind of reflection is not a “one 
and done.” Rather, continually reflecting on equality 
should be integrated into any organization that lays 
claim to democratic principles. This point is not to 
undermine democratic workplaces as “not really” doing 
equality, but, rather, we hope to help cooperatives and 
other democratic workplaces do what they do better. 
Practicing equality is not something that can be solved 
by institutional policy alone or by simply saying, “Let’s 
be democratic.” First, we must recognize that equality is 
an ongoing practice and one that needs to be cultivated 
as a dispositional habit.
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